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Abstract 
 
Is the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) ready for the challenge of cutting emissions 
by 20 %? This paper tries to provide an answer to this question by studying the 
efficiency of the scheme, both in the secondary and in the primary markets for 
allowances.  
On the one hand, this paper draws conclusions from the operation of the scheme so far. 
For this purpose, it studies a wide variety of market data using economic and 
econometric techniques. On the other hand, building on this evidence, this paper 
presents and evaluates some of the changes introduced in the scheme for the third 
trading period. 
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1. Introduction 
By 2012, the European Union and its Member States have committed, under the Kyoto 
Protocol, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 8% compared to the emission 
levels in 1990.
1
 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a cap and 
trade system devised to help the EU attain this objective. It is a market mechanism that 
works by first setting a cap to carbon-dioxide emissions and then allowing market 
participants to trade their allowances.  
According to the EU ETS, one allowance equals one ton of carbon-dioxide and it is 
initially allocated to one of the installations covered by scheme. As allowances can be 
freely traded among installations, the system allows for abatement at the lowest possible 
cost, under the assumption of efficient markets. Economic agents covered by the 
scheme have therefore three main options: (1) invest to reduce emissions and sell excess 
allowances; (2) reduce used capacity and sell excess allowances; or (3) maintain/expand 
capacity and buy additional allowances. 
When Kyoto expires in 2012, it is hoped that a new international agreement will replace 
it within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
However, so far negotiations have not brought any binding commitments. The accord of 
Copenhagen in December 2009 simply requests the parties to submit their unilateral 
targets. In January 2010, the European Union formally notified that it has unilaterally 
undertaken to reduce its emissions by 20% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Further, it 
restated its position in international negotiations; namely, its willingness to reduce an 
additional 10% on condition that “other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emission reductions and developing countries contribute adequately 
according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities”.2 
Under these circumstances, the key question is whether the ETS is ready for the 
challenge of cutting emissions by 20%. This paper will try to provide an answer to this 
question, which refers to the effectiveness and the efficiency of the scheme. In the 
following two chapters, trade in the secondary market for allowances and allocation in 
the primary market will be examined separately.  
On the one hand, this paper will draw conclusions from the operation of the scheme so 
far. For this purpose, economic and econometric analysis will be employed to analyse a 
wide variety of market data. On the other hand, building from the evidence previously 
gathered, this paper will present and evaluate some of the changes introduced in the 
scheme by the European legislator. 
                                                          
1
 The European Union acceded to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change by Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002. 
2
 Council of the European Union and European Commission: Expression of willingness to be associated 
with the Copenhagen Accord and submission of the quantified economy-wide emissions reduction targets 
for 2020. Brussels 28 January 2010. 
This position was established by the European Council as early as in March 2007, and provision is made 
in Directive 2003/87/EC for its review when an international agreement that satisfies this position is 
reached (Article 28, Directive 2003/87/EC). 
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2. Efficiency in the secondary market for allowances 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the performance of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) will be analyzed by referring to the functioning of the market for European Union 
Allowances (EUAs), that is, the secondary market for carbon-dioxide. With reference to 
the evolution of carbon prices, two main questions will be addressed: First, whether 
prices of EUAs are well grounded, that is, whether the price signals they provide are 
based on market fundamentals. Second, whether prices of EUAs follow an upward 
trend, that is, whether the evolution of prices is consistent with the logic of the scheme. 
Both these questions will prove relevant to assess the efficiency of the secondary market 
for allowances and the efficiency of the trading scheme in general. 
 
2.2. The secondary market for allowances 
During the first phase of the scheme, a demonstration period that lasted from 2005 until 
2007, the market for allowances emerged and trading platforms developed. Nowadays, 
not only over-the-counter operations take place but also standardized spot and future 
contracts are entered into at high volumes every day. Several private trading platforms 
coexist; including BlueNext, the European Climate Exchange or Climex, among many 
others. 
A brief observation of the evolution of allowance prices from 2005 until 2007 shows 
that, during the first half of the trading period, prices rose significantly up to 30€ per 
allowance. This was followed by a dramatic drop in April 2006 when the publication of 
emissions data showed an oversupply of allowances. It should be borne in mind that 
prior to April 2006, the amount of emissions generated by each installation had never 
been verified and hence expectations lacked appropriate reference. Later, prices 
converged towards zero as the end of the period approached and no banking was 
allowed towards the second phase of the ETS.
3
  
The second trading period started in 2008 and will end in 2012. It is important to 
remember that operators have the obligation to surrender allowances yearly but it is 
possible for them to bank and borrow allowances inside the trading period. During this 
second phase, prices of carbon in Europe have followed a more constant path, when 
compared to the first trading period. Initially, prices rose from 20€ up to around 28€ in 
June 2008. They then started to decrease, falling under 10€ in February 2009. 
                                                          
3
 Only in 2 Member States banking was allowed from the first to the second trading period, since the 
decision was left to the discretion of national authorities on condition that beneficiaries undertook 
supplementary emissions reductions. See page 11, Communication from the Commission on the 
assessment of National Allocation Plans for the allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances in the 
second period of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Taxes and ETS. COM (2006) 725 final, Brussels, 
9.11.2006. 
 
4 
Afterwards, they recovered and have remained quite stable under 15€ until mid-April 
2010.  
 
 
2.3. Literature on the drivers of the price EUAs 
A study frequently referred to in the literature is that of Alberola (2008) and others who 
analyzed the “Price drivers and structural breaks in European Carbon prices 2005-
2007”, that is, for the first trading period. In this study, the authors found statistical 
evidence of two structural changes in April 2006, where the Commission published its 
first report on verified emissions, and October 2006, where plans to make allocation 
more restrictive for the second period were announced. 
Moreover, Alberola (2009) found that, before the compliance break (July 2005 - April 
2006) prices of allowances mainly followed the evolution of prices of electricity power, 
probably because the market lacked sufficient maturity. However, after the compliance 
break (June 2006 - April 2007) prices of natural gas and coal became more significant, 
in a move towards “more energy fundamentals”. They also found that weather 
conditions, assessed as extremely cold or hot days, did not significantly affect the prices 
of allowances over the period considered. 
A later study that follows a similar approach was made by Bonacina (2009) and others. 
They analyzed the drivers of the price of allowances in the early part of the second 
phase of the trading scheme. They employed an error correction model and found that 
the market had reached maturity, “with energy fundamentals being the main drivers”. 
They found that the price of crude oil was the main driver of the price of allowances, 
together with the prices of coal and gas. They estimated that the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-term path was 8%. However, they also found that, from August 2008, 
prices of allowances tended to follow more closely the variations in the stock exchange, 
without there being a structural break. The authors argue this might reflect the effect of 
the financial turmoil in the market for emission allowances. 
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Another study that is also of interest is the one by Bredin (2009) and others. It focused 
on whether the price of allowances follows a stationary path or whether it is rather non-
stationary. Both the first and the second phase of the scheme are considered. The 
authors applied a wide variety of unit root tests and found that EUA prices follow a 
stochastic trend. 
 
2.4. Do carbon prices follow market fundamentals? 
In this section, econometric techniques will be employed in order to assess the extent to 
which the formation of carbon prices draws from the evolution of prices in energy 
markets. It is thought that prices of allowances should be heavily influenced by the 
relative prices of energy inputs, given that most emissions covered by the trading 
scheme are generated by the use of those inputs. In particular, electricity generation 
accounts for more than 60% of the emissions covered by the ETS. This also means that 
the impact of the prices of energy will be nuanced by the relative efficiency of each 
individual energy source, both in terms of their potential to generate power and their 
carbon-intensity. Alternatively, if it was found that energy prices had no bearing on 
allowance prices, this will most likely mean that the carbon market had not reached 
maturity and that allowances were rather the object of some kind of speculative trade. 
 
2.4.1. Dataset used in the study 
 BNS EUA 08-12 (€ per allowance) 
For the purpose of this study, the dependent variable is the spot price of European 
Union Allowances (EUAs) during the second trading period. There is a choice among 
different trading platforms but BlueNext has been chosen since it is the most liquid one.  
BlueNext is the leading spot exchange in the world for EUAs. It is a multilateral trading 
facility; a joint venture of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Caisse des 
Dépôts; a French financial institution that has a public nature and is committed to be a 
long term investor in projects of general interest.  
In technical terms, the price considered here is the BlueNext Spot EUA 2008-2012, 
where the underlying is European Union Allowance 2008-2012 issued by the Member 
States according to their National Allocation Plans. The minimum volume per operation 
in BlueNext is 1,000 tones. Trading is continuous from 8:00 am to 6:00 pm, Monday to 
Friday. Delivery and Settlement are realized by BlueNext in real time. BlueNext 
operates a transit account in the French registry through which it transfers the 
underlying from the seller’s account to the buyer’s account in their respective 
registries.
4
 
                                                          
4
 Data series start on the 26
th
 of February 2008 and is updated daily. Data can be found at the website of 
BlueNext following the link “Statistics” and then “Downloads” (http://www.bluenext.fr/) 
6 
 Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (€ per barrel) 
Brent is a reference oil for the various types of oil in the North Sea, used as a basis for 
pricing (West Texas Intermediate and Dubai are other reference oils). FOB refers to 
Free On Board, which is a standard set of clauses used in international contract law. 
Prices are given in Dollars per barrel; the official exchange rates from the European 
Central Bank have been used to convert these prices into Euros. 
Data are converted into Euros per Megawatt-hour, in order to make prices more readily 
comparable with those of the rest of energy sources employed in this study. According 
to the International Energy Agency, 1 barrel of oil equals 1.57162162 MWh.
5
 
 APX Gas ZEE (€ per thermal unit) 
APX Gas Zeebrugge BV is a day-ahead market that operates on Belgian business days, 
from 06:00 am to 18:00 pm. Spots contracts are traded on a continuous and anonymous 
basis and prices are expressed in Euros per thermal unit. APX Gas ZEE is one of the 
biggest gas markets in Europe and it is used by gas operators to balance their portfolios 
in the short term.  
Data are converted into Euros per Megawatt-hour. According to the International 
Energy Agency, 1 thermal unit of natural gas equals 0.029307 MWh.
6
 
 Coal CIF ARA Stm 6000K Ppt (€ per million tons) 
Spot CIF ARA daily prices of coal are provided by Platts Energy Market Assessments. 
CIF stands for Coast, Insurance and Freight, under international contract law. ARA 
defines the price of coal delivered to the large North West European ports of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp. Stm stands for steam coal, which is coal used for 
steam rising and space heating purposes; hence, for electricity production, which is the 
relevant use for this study. Technically, according to the OECD, it includes all 
anthracite coals and bituminous coals not classified as coking coal. 
Data are converted into Euros per Megawatt-hour. According to the International 
Energy Agency, 1 ton of coal equals 8.141 MWh.
7
 
 Elspot prices (€ per Megawatt-hour) 
Elspot is the common power market for the Nordic countries and the largest physical 
power market in the world. The market functions daily and contracts are concluded one-
                                                          
5
 Data can be found at the website of the EIA (US Energy Information Administration) following the link 
“Petroleum” and then “Spot Prices” (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov). 
Foreign currencies have been converted into Euros, at the official rates from the European Central Bank, 
available at its website following the link “Statistical Data Warehouse” (http://www.ecb.int). 
6
 Data can be found at the APX Group website following the link “Market Data” 
(http://www.apxgroup.com). 
7
 Data can be purchased via the website of Platts (http://www.platts.com/). The data points obtained start 
on the 1
st
 of January 2008 and end on the 31
th
 of December 2009, imposing the upper time limit for this 
study. These data have been kindly offered by Platts, a McGraw-Hill company, for the purpose of this 
study. They may not be reproduced elsewhere. 
7 
day ahead of physical delivery of the energy through the grid. The system price used 
here is given by the balance between bids and offers in the market, that is, the 
equilibrium between supply and demand.
8
 
 FTSEurofirst 100 Index (€) 
The FTSEurofirst 100 Index measures the performance of the 100 largest capitalized 
European companies, both inside the European Monetary Union and in the United 
Kingdom. The index is calculated in Euros.
9
 This index is used in this study to control 
for the influence of financial variables in the evolution of the prices of allowances. 
 
2.4.2. Derived data 
Following the methodology from Tendances Carbone (Caisse de Dépôts) published in 
2007
10
; the following indicators were constructed on the basis of the previous dataset. 
These indicators bring in information about the relative efficiency of the different 
energy sources for the production of electricity. Both efficiency in terms of electricity 
produced per unit of energy input and carbon-dioxide generated are considered in these 
indicators. 
 Switch price (€ per Megawatt-hour) 
Switch price is the price of EUAs that will theoretically allow the switch from coal to 
natural gas in power generation. It is the price above which it becomes profitable in the 
short term for a power plant to move from coal to natural gas. It equates the marginal 
costs for each additional MWh produced from coal and from gas (cost of coal + cost of 
CO2 when using coal = cost of gas + cost of CO2 when using gas).
11
 
              
            ⁄                ⁄
                          ⁄⁄
 
                                                          
8
 Elspot is operated by Nord Pool Spot: “The largest physical power market in the world, offering both 
day-ahead and intraday markets Nord Pool Spot’s system price is the reference price for futures, forwards 
and options traded in the financial market. The system price is also the reference price for the Nordic 
OTC/bilateral wholesale market and used by distributors as basis for quoting prices to end consumers. 
The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) regulates Nord Pool Spot and issues the 
market place concession. The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) has authorized Nord 
Pool Spot to organize the physical exchange of power with neighbouring countries.” 
Data can be found at Nord Pool Spot website, following the link “Elspot Market Data” 
(http://www.nordpoolspot.com/). 
9
 Data can be found at NYSE Euronext website following the link “Indices” and then “Global Indices” 
(http://www.euronext.com). 
10
 Tendances Carbone. Methodology – Version 3, September 2007. Caisse des Dépôts. 
11
  The description of these variables is the following: 
o cost (gas): Production cost of one MWh of electricity on base of net CO2 emissions of gas in €/MWh 
= (€/therm)/0.02931 
o cost (coal): Production cost of one MWh of electricity on base of net CO2 emissions of coal in 
€/MWh = (€/tone)/0.8141 
o tCO2 (coal): Emissions factor (CO2/MWh) of a conventional coal-fired plant: 0.86 tCO2/MWh 
o tCO2 (gas): Emissions factor (CO2/MWh) of a conventional gas-fired plant: 0.36 tCO2/MWh 
 
8 
 Clean Dark Spread (€ per Megawatt-hour) 
Clean Dark Spread is here the difference between the price of electricity and the price of 
coal used to generate that electricity, corrected for the energy output of the coal plant.
12
 
                 (       
 
     
)               
 Clean Spark Spread (€ per Megawatt-hour) 
Clean Spark Spread is here the difference between the price of electricity and the price 
of gas used to generate that electricity, corrected for the energy output of the gas plant.
13
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)              
Hence, the switch price can also be understood as the equilibrium between the clean 
dark spread and the clean spark spread: 
    
          
            
 
 
 
                                                          
12
  The description of these variables is the following: 
o Pelectricity : Price of electricity Elspot, in €/MWh 
o Pcoal : Price of coal CIF ARA in €/MWh 
o ρcoal : Net thermal Efficiency of a conventional coal-fired plant: 40% 
o PEUA : Price of CO2 of BlueNext in € 
o FEcoal : Emissions factor (CO2/MWh) of a conventional coal-fired plant: 0.86 tCO2/MWh 
 
13
  The description of these variables is the following: 
o Pelectricity : Price of electricity Elspot, in €/MWh 
o Pgas : Price of Zeebrugge gas in €/MWh 
o ρgas : Net thermal Efficiency of a conventional gas-fired plant: 55% 
o PEUA : Price of CO2 of BlueNext in € 
o FEgas : Emissions factor (CO2/MWh) of a conventional gas-fired plant: 0.36 tCO2/MWh 
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2.4.3. Discussion on methodology 
The data series studied here present high volatility so that the assumption of 
homoskedasticity (constant variance) is not appropriate. On the one hand, implementing 
standard regressions and error correction models has shown that there is 
heteroskedasticity and that GARCH (1,1) behaviour is present. On the other hand, 
testing for higher order GARCH proved inconclusive. 
GARCH (p,q) stands for Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity. It 
models the conditional variance of the dependent variable as an Autoregressive Moving 
Average Model (ARMA); meaning that the variance of the dependent variable depends 
on its past values and on the values of the error term. This way the model captures both 
periods of tranquillity and volatility in the dependent variable.
14
 
The conditional variance in the GARCH (p,q) model is given by: 
  
     ∑      
  ∑  
 
   
    
  
 
   
          
           
  
The model for the error term is given by an ARMA [max(p,q),p] model: 
  
    [         ]    
               
Generally, ARMA models offer a more parsimonious description of the temporal 
dependencies in the conditional mean than AR models; hence GARCH modelling 
usually gives better results than traditional ARCH modelling. GARCH (1,1) rather than 
ARCH (1), that is GARCH (0,1), is employed here.
15
 
 
2.4.4. Regression specification 
In sum, this econometric analysis, models the prices of EUAs as dependent variable on 
the following regressors: 
- Past values of the prices of allowances. 
- Energy fundamentals. 
- On the one hand, energy prices (prices of oil, coal, gas and power). 
- On the other hand, the switch price, the clean dark spread and the clean spark 
spread (in order to capture the relative efficiencies of energy sources).   
- Financial fundamentals, using the value of the stock exchange to control for the 
effect of this variable. 
Data series are expressed in logarithms whenever possible to allow for the interpretation 
of the coefficients in the regression in terms of elasticities or semi-elasticities. A further 
                                                          
14
 For the references used to decide upon the methodology used in this study and elaborate this section, 
please consult the bibliography. 
15
 Idem. 
10 
motivation to take natural logarithms is for the distributions of the variables to become 
closer to the normal distribution, although given the large sample, asymptotic normality 
can be assumed.  
Data series are expressed in first differences given the existence of unit root processes in 
the dependent variable and in some of the regressors. This way these series are 
transformed into stationary time series. 
Finally, GARCH (1,1) modelling is used. As previously stated, GARCH processes of a 
higher order were rejected when testing for them. 
The following specification is obtained after dropping irrelevant regressors of the 
highest lag and of the highest p-value: 
                                                              
                                                   
                                   
 
2.4.5. Interpretation of results 
           ̂                                            
                                           
                                              
                                           
Interesting conclusions can be drawn from these results that are a strong indicative of 
the quality of the price signal provided by the secondary market for allowances: 
 The switch price, the clean dark spread and the clean spark spread are the main 
drivers of the price level of allowances. These regressors codify information about 
the evolution of allowances prices, the prices of gas and coal, their respective 
emission coefficients and their respective efficiencies when used to produce 
electricity. 
 The price of coal also plays a substantial role in determining the price of allowances. 
This is a logical result as coal is the most carbon-dioxide intensive of all the energy 
sources taken into account.  
 The prices of electricity also play some role. 
 The coefficients associated with the prices of crude oil and gas are not relevant. This 
is surprising but, in the case of gas, can be explained by the inclusion of derived 
data like the switch price and the clean spark spread. 
  Influence from the evolution of the stock exchange is ruled out. 
11 
 When the difference in the prices of allowances between t-3 and t-2 increases there 
is a tendency for the difference between t-1 and t to decrease. 
It can therefore be concluded from these results that the formation of carbon prices in 
the most liquid trading platform, BlueNext, follows the evolution of energy 
fundamentals, which supports the argument of prices for allowances constituting a 
consistent price signal.  
A detailed interpretation of each coefficient in the regression can be found in the 
annexes and will provide the reader with a deeper understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying the formation of prices in the secondary market for emissions. 
 
2.5. Is there an upward trend in the price of allowances? 
This is the second research question asked in this paper about the efficiency of the 
secondary market for allowances. It will, at the same time, serve as bridge to the next 
chapter on the efficiency of the primary market. Before looking for an answer, it is 
important to note the links that exist between both markets with regard to the emergence 
of an upward trend in prices. So far, emission allowances have been allocated for free 
almost in their entirety, which has lead to several types of distortions. For instance, it 
has arguably led to windfall profits, particularly for power generators in some European 
countries. These profits are pernicious, not only because they lead to higher prices for 
end-consumers but because, while doing the former, they reward the polluter and do not 
generate enough incentives to abate emissions.
16
 The reader should hence be aware that, 
even though prices are well grounded in the secondary market, there remain distortions 
that are likely to affect the emergence of an upward trend in prices. 
Is there then an upward trend in the price of EUAs? The number of allowances allotted 
sets a limit to the amount of carbon-dioxide that installations covered by the scheme can 
emit all together. As previously mentioned, trade between installations is allowed to 
facilitate abatement at the lowest possible costs. It is generally accepted that, as years go 
by, prices of carbon-dioxide should go up for the following reasons: 
 Within the logic of the scheme, the overall cap is due to diminish yearly to take 
account of the reductions in emissions achieved the year before. 
 The EU has committed itself to reduce emissions up to 20% by 2020. This target 
requires reductions to progressively increase. Hence, if the EU is to stick to its 
commitment, yearly caps will need to be reduced further.
17
 
                                                          
16
 It is understood that companies price their products adding a mark-up to their marginal costs. Since 
these costs include opportunity costs, like the profit missed by not selling an allowance on the market, the 
polluter may, under certain circumstances, extract profit as a consequence of the mere allocation of 
allowances. 
17
 According to article 9 of Directive 2003/87/EC, from 2013, the total number of allowances issued will 
decrease each year by a linear factor of 1.74% compared to the mean for the previous trading period.  
12 
 As relatively cheap abatement options are undertaken, relatively expensive 
abatement options will be left. The quantity of “low-hanging fruits” is difficult to 
estimate and new ones may present themselves as technology evolves. However, it 
is understood that prices of carbon-dioxide will need to go up in the future in order 
to provide enough incentives to achieve reductions in emissions. 
From this it can be seen that the presence of an upward trend in prices would be a strong 
indicative of the scheme functioning properly. That trend cannot be observed and the 
series of EUA spot prices during 2008 and 2009 rather shows a random-walk type of 
behaviour.  
In order to reach this conclusion, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test has been employed 
here. Under the null hypothesis the process follows an AR (1) process with ρ equal to 1. 
Following this test, the null cannot be rejected, which means that the presence of an 
upward time trend can be excluded. In fact, a downward trend can be observed in the 
graphical representation of the prices of allowances. 
 
The results of this test should be taken with caution as it is only two years since the 
second phase of the scheme began. Additionally, global recession has contracted 
production and hence has had a negative impact on the prices of allowances (acting as a 
demand shock). Nevertheless, the results of this test indicate that more stringent caps 
may be required in the future for the scheme to remain effective. An estimation of the 
impact of the recession on the market for allowances will be provided in the next 
chapter. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this study on the efficiency of the secondary 
market for allowances: 
First, using GARCH modelling it has been shown that energy fundamentals, rather than 
financial ones, are the main drivers of the prices of EUAs. This is an indication of the 
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secondary market for emission permits having reached maturity in the EU. This study 
has focused on energy prices, emission coefficients of energy sources and efficiency 
rates of coal and gas when used for producing electricity. However, these are not the 
only drivers of the prices of allowances. The literature beliefs that other factors like 
economic growth, abatement costs or the level of competition in the markets are key 
drivers over the medium to long term. Given the recent introduction of the emissions 
trading scheme and hence the few number of observations available, studying the 
impact of the mentioned factors is not yet possible. Nevertheless, it is shown here that 
energy fundamentals are indeed relevant factors in determining the evolution of the 
prices of carbon-dioxide, at least over the short to medium term. 
Second, it has been shown that there is no upward trend in prices, even though the 
scheme can be deemed to be functioning properly and to provide clear and well 
grounded price signals. It should be borne in mind that whether the upward trend in 
prices appears over the years remains the responsibility of the European and national 
authorities. Ultimately, only by generating scarcity in the market for allowances the 
objective of the scheme can be fulfilled. The total number of allowances allotted and the 
methodology followed for allocating them are the central research questions of the next 
chapter. 
 
3. Efficiency in the primary market for allowances  
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter key aspects of the secondary market for allowances were 
analysed and two main conclusions were drawn: (1) formation of prices follows market 
fundamentals but (2) it is feared the price signal is not sufficiently strong given the 
absence of an upward trend. A caveat was made with regard to the provision of 
allowances for free in first instance and the distortion for prices this may entail. 
Efficiency in the primary market is hence an issue of great concern.  
In this chapter, reference will be made to the different methods to allocate allowances in 
the primary market; namely grandfathering, benchmarking and auctioning. The Union 
will be introducing important changes in 2013 to ensure the system is fit for meeting the 
ambitious targets set for 2020. In this sense, reference will be made to the 2009 revision 
of Directive 2003/87/EC
18
 and to the proposal for a regulation on harmonised 
auctioning.
19
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 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community. 
19
 This proposal became Commission Regulation No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, 
administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the Community. 
14 
From a more empirical point of view, the level of allowances allocated and the level of 
emissions verified will be compared. In particular, the allocation for the second trading 
period will be scrutinised. Following the methodology of the Commission, an 
approximation to the impact of the economic downturn on allocation will be unveiled. 
This will give the reader more insight into the reasons why no upward trend can be 
observed in the prices of EUAs. 
 
3.2. Allowances allocated and verified emissions compared 
Before going into more detailed analysis, it is useful to compare how the yearly cap set 
at the beginning of each trading period relates to verified emissions. The following 
graph and table compare these two magnitudes and provide an approximation as to the 
difference between both of them. 
 
Ex-ante caps for each trading period and verified emissions (million allowances)
20
 
first trading period second trading period 
ex-ante 
yearly 
cap 
verified emissions ex-ante 
yearly 
cap 
extended 
scope 
(yearly) 
verified emissions 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2.298,50 2.122,16 2.033,64 2.049,93 2.080,93 54,61 2.111,57 1.909,59 
% of cap 92% 88% 89% % of cap 2% 101% 88% 
                                                          
20
 European Commission: Emissions trading: EU-wide cap for 2008-2012 set at 2.08 billion allowances 
after assessment of national plans for Bulgaria. IP/07/1614, Brussels, 26 October 2007.  
& 
European Commission: Emissions trading: 2007 verified emissions from EU ETS businesses. IP/08/787, 
Brussels, 23 May 2008. 
& 
Compliance data available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en_phase_ii.htm#reports 
[Files “2008 Compliance Data, extract from CITL 26/08/2009” and “Verified Emissions for 2008-2009 
and allocations 2008-2009”] 
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It is found that, in four out of the five years the scheme has been operational so far, 
more allowances had been issued than tons of carbon-dioxide were emitted to the 
atmosphere; only in 2008 there was no overallocation.  
With regard to the first trading period, it should be borne in mind that it was a trial 
period. In fact, despite overallocation, the first phase of the scheme can be judged to 
have been rather successful, since its main objectives were attained; carbon markets 
emerged and a price for carbon materialized. 
As for the second trading period, a far more stringent cap made overallocation less 
likely. Thus, in 2008, emissions were higher than allocated allowances. However, in 
2009, verified emissions were again lower than allotted permits. The following 
discussion will analyse this phenomenon into greater detail. 
Moreover, the reader should be aware of the quantitative differences that exist between 
yearly caps set ex-ante for each period and the final number of allowances that are 
effectively allocated each year. These differences arise because the overall ex-ante cap 
for the EU is formally the addition of the caps set in every National Allocation Plan 
(NAP). Further, these national caps are themselves the sum of the number of allowances 
allotted to each installation. In the end, allowances belong to installations and, as their 
number varies given closures and openings, differences arise between the cap set at the 
beginning of the trading period and the effective cap in a given year. 
Verified data are stored in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). 
Following these data for the second trading period it is possible to provide a more 
accurate picture of the difference between emissions and allocated allowances.  
 In 2008, verified emissions were 10.50% higher than the allowances allocated to 
installations.
21
  
 
                                                          
21
 Verified emissions in 2008 were 2.111.565.406 tones of CO2 and allocated emissions were 
1.909.588.781 tones of CO2 for the 12.229 installations computed.  
Data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en_phase_ii.htm#reports  
[File: 2008 Compliance Data, extract from CITL 26/08/2009] 
10% 
90% 
Excess emissions in 2008 
Excess emissions
Effectively allocated
allowances
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 However in 2009, verified emissions were 5% lower than allowances allocated.22 
 
 
3.3. Allocation in the second trading period 
As explained before, verified emissions in the first trading period significantly exceeded 
the number of allowances allocated, which led to the collapse of the carbon price. 
Emissions were first verified in 2005 where it was unveiled that just over 2 billion tons 
of carbon-dioxide had been emitted that year, while overall allowances allocated 
amounted to more than 2.2 billion.
23
 
When the time came for the Commission to approve the National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs) for the second trading period, it was essential to avoid overallocation. The 
Commission made clear that otherwise, “the development and deployment of existing 
and new clean technologies would stall, and the evolution of a dynamic and liquid 
global market would be seriously undermined”.24 
While NAPs for the first trading period were approved based on estimated emissions, 
since 2005 high quality data per installation are available, verified by independent 
sources. Hence, national authorities and the Commission did not have in 2006 the same 
information deficit with regard to actual emissions that they faced for the first (trial) 
trading period. 
To determine the annual cap for each country, the Commission follows the following 
formula, which takes into account verified emissions, GDP growth, carbon intensity and 
extensions in the scope of the scheme. 
                          
                                          
                                                          
22
 Verified emissions in 2009 were 1.830.278.158 tones of CO2 and allocated emissions were 
1.926.803.921 tones of CO2 or the 12.598 installations computed. 
Data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en_phase_ii.htm#reports  
[File: Verified Emissions for 2008-2009 and allocations 2008-2009] 
23
 Page 2, COM (2006) 725 final. 
24
 Page 2, COM (2006) 725 final. 
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Ex-post adjustments of the absolute quantity of allowances in each NAP are not allowed 
by Directive 2003/87/EC.
26
 The EU emissions trading scheme operates by setting an up-
front cap to emissions; it is understood that there cannot be any possibility of modifying 
the cap after the start of a given trading period; otherwise, it would not be possible for 
the carbon market to operate with a sufficient level of certainty and stability. Further, 
positive differentials between the cap and verified emissions cannot always be blamed 
on overallocation, that is, poor ex-ante estimation, but may well be the consequence of 
reductions in emissions undertook as a consequence of the incentives set up by the 
scheme. Hence, careful analysis needs to be carried out not only ex-ante but also ex-
post, the later one in order to determine the efficiency of the scheme and ameliorate 
subsequent estimates when setting caps for the following trading periods. 
The Commission estimated the Carbon Intensity Trend Development (CITD) as -2.5% 
from 2005 to 2010 (5 years), that is -0.5% each year. It is understood that reduction in 
carbon intensity, that is, emissions per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), leads to 
lower emissions.  
With regard to the Growth Trend Development (GTD), the Commission followed its 
own estimates of GDP growth for the period 2005-2010, which predicted an average 
growth in output of over 2% per year
27
. It is assumed for setting the cap that higher 
growth leads to higher emissions, although, under appropriate incentives such as the 
ETS, intense growth may well lead to deployment of more efficient technologies and 
even to absolute reductions in emissions. This type of inter-relations is what makes the 
setting of ex-ante caps particularly complex. In fact, emissions in Europe remained 
stable from 1990 to 2000, given that carbon intensity decreased at a similar rate as GDP 
increased.
28
 It is arguable what share of the reduction in carbon intensity is due to more 
efficient technologies and what share is due to the decline of the industrial sector in 
Europe. 
Given the methodology and estimates mentioned above, the Commission reviewed each 
NAP and came up with a total of 2.081 billion allowances per year from 2008 to 2012 
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 Page 6, COM (2006) 725 final. 
26
 Article 11 and Annex III (criterion 10), Directive 2003/87/EC. 
27
 European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs: European Economic 
Forecast - autumn 2006. Brussels, October 2006. 
& 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport: European Energy and Transport: 
Trends to 2030 - Update 2005. Brussels, 22 May 2006. 
28
 Page 5, Communication from the Commission on further guidance on allocation plans for the 2008 to 
2012 trading period of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. COM (2005) 703 final, Brussels, 22.12.2005. 
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for the whole of the Union.
29
 During this process, the Commission managed to reduce 
the initial number of allowances proposed by the Member States by 10.5%.
30
 In 
comparative terms, this cap represents 140 million allowances less than 2005 verified 
emissions; this is a reduction of almost 7% in the number of allowances issued, when 
the extension in scope of the scheme for the second trading period is taken into 
account.
31
 
3.3.1. Impact of the economic downturn 
Following the methodology used by the Commission to determine the Maximum 
Allowed Annual Average Cap (MAAAC), in this section, the impact of the economic 
downturn, or rather the impact of the lack of anticipation of this downturn, will be 
discussed. 
The Commission used data from DG Economy and Finance and DG Transport to 
determine the Growth Trend Development (GTD); in the following table these data are 
reproduced. While the Commission used forecasts about GDP growth available in 2006, 
the following table also contains the most recent statistics and forecasts published by the 
same sources. 
Growth Trend Development (GTD)  
Date of report 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DG ECFIN forecasts* of real GDP growth in the EU (in percentage per year)
32
 
Autumn 2006 1,3 2,4 1,7 2,8* 2,4* 2,4* - - - 
Autumn 2009 - - - 3,2 2,9 0,8 -4,1* 0,7* 1,6* 
DG TREN forecasts* of real GDP growth in the EU (in percentage per year)
33
 
Update 2005 1,94* 2,13* 
Update 2007 2,15* 2,06* 
In the previous table, one can see the difference between forecasted and real growth, 
given the difficulty to anticipate the financial turmoil and the later recession from 2007. 
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 Page 14, COM (2005) 703 final. 
30
 Page 14, COM (2005) 703 final. 
31
 European Commission: Emissions trading: Commission adopts amendment decision on the Slovak 
National Allocation Plan for 2008 to 2012. IP/07/1869, Brussels, 7 December 2007. 
32
 Page 4, European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs: European 
Economic Forecast - autumn 2006. Brussels, October 2006.  
& 
Page 20, European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs: European 
Economic Forecast - autumn 2009. Brussels, October 2009. 
33
 Page 16 European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport: European Energy and 
Transport: Trends to 2030 - Update 2005. Brussels, 22 May 2006.  
& 
Page 31, European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport: European Energy and 
Transport: Trends to 2030 - Update 2007. Brussels, 8 April 2008. 
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When assessing the NAPs for the 2008-2012 trading period, it is understood that the 
Commission determined the GTD as detailed in the following table, that is, by using 
data available in 2006 and 2007 to determine the average yearly growth for 2005-2010. 
GTD 2005-2010 estimation based on data available in 2006-2007 (in percentage) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005-10 GTD 
1,7 2,8* 2,4* 2,4* 1,94* 2,13* 14,13 2,36 
GTD 2005-2010 estimation based on data available in 2009-2010 (in percentage) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005-10 GTD 
1,7 3,2 2,9 0,8 -4,1* 0,7* 5,13 0,85 
 
GTD for the period 2005-2010 calculated on the basis of data available in 2006-2007 
equals approximately an average growth of GDP of 2,36% per year. However, using 
data available in 2009-2010, GTD is reduced to 0,85% per year. The difference is very 
significant and could potentially have resulted in an overallocation of allowances for the 
second trading period.  
In the following table, the maximum allowed annual average cap (MAAAC) calculated 
by the Commission is traced back using both estimates of GTD. The purpose is to 
assess what the ex-ante yearly cap on emissions would have been for the whole of the 
EU if the growth trend development for the period 2005-2010 had been correctly 
identified by the Commission at the time it issued its decisions on the National 
Allocation Plans. 
Tracing back the maximum allowed annual average cap (MAAAC) 
Estimates IVE CIVE* GTD CITD ADD MAAAC 
Data 2006-2007 2.122,16 1989,65 2,36% -0,5% 54,61 2080,93 
Data 2009-2010 2.122,16 1989,65 0,85% -0.5% 54,61 2.051,23 
Difference - - 1,50% - - 29,70 
* GIVE is calculated here by taking the rest of the variables in the equation fixed. 
 
It is found that there is an overallocation of 30 million allowances for each year of the 
second trading period, that is, 150 million allowances in total. This overallocation is 
attributable to the change in GDP growth brought by the global recession, which was 
not anticipated at the time.  
20 
 
It should be taken into account however, that overallocation of allowances should rather 
be assessed at the end of a trading period. As previously stated, in 2009, verified 
emissions were 5% lower than allowances allocated while in 2008 verified emissions 
were 10.50% higher. This means that in 2008, there were around 200 million tons of 
excess emissions while in 2009 there were around 95 million allowances overallocated. 
The overall effect is that, so far in the second trading period, there has been more than 
100 million tons of carbon-dioxide emitted in excess to the atmosphere. It should be 
remembered that banking of allowances is permitted in the scheme. 
 
What matters is whether by the end of the trading period, the balance of emissions stays 
below the addition of the yearly caps. Moreover, what matters is that the overall cap is 
in accordance with the commitments of the European Union to reduce emissions and 
with scientific evidence about the level of abatement required to keep the rise in 
temperatures under reasonable bounds. Changes have been introduced in the 
architecture of the scheme to ensure this, as explained in the next section on the future 
of the overall cap. 
 
 
 
98,6% 
1,4% 
Likely overallocation due to the economic downturn 
Yearly ex-ante cap
Likely yearly
overallocation
3% 
97% 
Excess emissions so far in the second trading period 
Excess emissions 2008-
2009
Effectively allocated
allowances 2008-2009
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3.4. Future of the overall cap 
The setting of caps through National Allocation Plans will be phased-out, given changes 
brought in by the 2009 revision of Directive 2003/87/EC
34
, as well as by Directive 
2008/101/EC
35
, which introduced aviation into the ETS. Linear reduction paths will be 
introduced, which will bring in more consistency, greater predictability and a higher 
likelihood of attaining the desired reductions in emissions. 
For aviation, in 2012 the total amount of allowances allocated will be 97% of the mean 
average of the actual emissions in 2004, 2005 and 2006. From 2013 onwards the 
percentage will be reduced to 95%.
36
 
For stationary installations, starting from 2013, the total number of allowances issued 
will decrease each year by a linear factor of 1.74% compared to the mean for the 
previous trading period.
37
 This linear reduction path will amount to a reduction of 21% 
in emissions by 2020, compared to verified emissions in 2005
38
. Taking the cap for 
phase two and applying the linear factor, it is possible to find good projections today of 
the caps for the third trading period. This is a step-change in terms of the legal certainty 
and predictability of the scheme that will surely bring investments forward and improve 
the quality of carbon price signals. 
 
                                                          
34
  Directive 2009/29/EC. 
35
 Directive 2008/101/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community 
36
 Articles 3c.1 and 3c.2, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
37
 Article 9, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
38
 The 21% reduction target for the ETS is coupled with a 10% reduction target for the sectors not 
covered by the scheme. Both these targets together will bring the UE to fulfil its commitment to reduce 
green house gas emissions by 20% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels (that is down by 14% by 2020 
compared to 2005 levels). See page 3 of European Commission: Questions and Answers on the 
Commission's proposal to revise the EU Emissions Trading System. MEMO/08/35, Brussels, 23 January 
2008. 
2.044,72 
2.009,14 
1.974,18 
1.939,83 
1.906,08 
1.872,91 
1.840,33 
1.808,30 
2013
2014
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2016
2017
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2019
2020
Estimated caps for the third trading period (million allowances) 
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3.5. Assessment of the different methods to allocate allowances 
It is understood that moving from free allocation to auctioning is a key element to avoid 
the distortions likely generated by the former during the first trading period and the 
current one. Basic economic principles suggest that free allocation distorts price signals, 
providing wrong incentives for installations and hence running against the objective of 
reducing emissions. Furthermore, free allocation may, under certain circumstances, 
generate windfall profits, rewarding the polluter, which is against the basic “polluter 
pays principle” at the heart of the environmental law of the EU.39 
For the first and second trading period, the number of EUAs allotted to each installation 
covered by the scheme was based on grandfathering almost in their entirety.
40
 However, 
Directive 2003/87/EC was modified in 2009 in order to take account of scientific 
evidence favouring auctioning and strict benchmarking. In the following sections these 
changes will be presented and assessed. 
3.5.1. Future of the allocation methods 
Directive 2008/101/EC integrated aviation in the emissions trading scheme from 2012 
while allowing for a differential treatment. Although the factual characteristics of 
aviation that justify these differences are not the matter of this paper, since allowances 
can be traded among all operators covered by the scheme, it is necessary to refer also to 
allocation to aircraft operators.  
 There will be no grandfathering of allowances but allocation based on benchmarks 
in terms of tonne-kilometre.
41
  
 Only 15% of the total allowances will be auctioned from 2012, there being no 
provision to increase this ratio, although the possibility is left open for this ratio to 
be increased in a future general review of Directive 2003/87/EC.
42
  
 All revenues obtained by Member States through the auctioning of aviation 
allowances shall be employed for the purposes of tackling global warming both 
within the Union and abroad. This is a legal requirement imposed by Directive 
2003/87/EC, notwithstanding the liberty of Member States to choose the specific 
projects they desire to finance with the proceeds from auctioning.
43
 
For stationary installations, the 2009 revision of Directive 2003/87/EC
44
 introduces 
radical changes with regard to the methodologies used to allocate allowances, phasing-
out the system based on National Allocation Plans (NAPs). 
                                                          
39
 Article 191.2, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40
 Information about auctions that have taken place during the second trading period can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm 
41
 Articles 3e.3, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
42
 Articles 3d.1 and 3d.2, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
43
 Article 3d.4, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
44
 Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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 Grandfathering is discarded and the Union undertakes to harmonise the rules for 
allocation by determining Union-wide ex-ante benchmarks. These benchmarks will 
be set per products (instead of per inputs) and will be based on the performance of 
the 10% most efficient installations for each product in 2007 and 2008.
45
 
The aim is to avoid incentives to maintain or increase emissions, by taking into 
account “the most efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes, 
high efficiency cogeneration, efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of 
biomass and capture and storage of CO2, where such facilities are available”.
46
 
 From 2013 the amount of allowances auctioned will be 20% of the total number of 
allowances issued. This ratio will progressively increase until reaching 70% 
auctioning in 2020 and 100% in 2027.
47
 
 In addition, there will be no free allocation to electricity generators from 2013, 
given claims of windfall profits during the first trading period.
48
 It is worth noting 
that, as the sector faces particularly low competitive pressure from electricity 
producers outside the EU, it has consistently been the target for the most 
constraining provisions; ever since the first trading period where almost the full 
burden of reduced emissions was placed in this sector.
49
 There are however some 
transitional derogations from this provision, in order to encourage the modernisation 
of production and distribution capacities in some of the recently acceded Member 
States.
50
 
 With regard to the proceeds from auctioning for stationary installations, the 
requirement to destine revenues generated by auctioning to environmental projects 
is limited to 50% of those revenues. However, the type of projects that can be 
financed is further specified in Directive 2003/87/EC, while respecting the capacity 
of Member States to select those projects.
51
 
The impact of this change in the methodology to allocate allowances will likely be 
significant. Benchmarking will induce investments given that it would be based on the 
emissions performance of the most advanced technologies in use. Furthermore, the 
move from free allocation towards auctioning will improve the quality of the price 
signals in carbon markets.  
However, it could be argued that opting for benchmarking, even though as a transitory 
instrument, is a poor decision. On the one hand, benchmarking is still free allocation 
and therefore distorts carbon price signals and goes against the “polluter pays” 
principle. On the other hand, developing benchmarks could potentially become more 
burdensome and costly than the European legislator seems to anticipate.  
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 Articles 10a.1 and 10a.2, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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 Article 10a.1, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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 Article 10a.11, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
48
 Article 10a.3, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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 See Denny (2008). 
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 Article 10c, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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 Article 10.3, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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Administrative costs could be high given that, even though emissions data per 
installation are reliable, difficulties may arise when determining which are the most 
efficient installations. Why incurring these costs when the Directive itself, as well as 
most scientific literature, present benchmarking as a second-best alternative to 
auctioning? By the end of 2010 the Commission should come up with detailed 
principles to determine those benchmarks.
52
  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the scheme so far has lacked efficiency in the primary market 
for allowances. On the one hand, grandfathering and lack of reliable emissions data 
caused overallocation in the first trading period. Furthermore, given the lack of 
anticipation of the economic downturn, allocation based on 2005 verified emissions has 
also caused oversupply in the second trading period. On the other hand, free allocation 
has been the source of windfall profits and reduced quality of price signals in general. 
However, the necessary reforms have been undertaken. First, a clear reduction path of 
the overall cap has been inserted into the law, so that the Union will more likely meet its 
objective of 20% less emissions by 2020. Second, the phase-out of National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) and the full harmonisation of allocation methods will improve 
consistency. Moreover, benchmarking based on most efficient installations will help to 
make caps more stringent for those sectors with more potential to reduce emissions. 
Finally, the move towards auctioning will tackle the issue of windfall profits; generate 
revenues that can be invested in the transition to a low-carbon economy; and, most 
importantly, substantially improve the quality of price signals in the carbon markets 
aligning both the primary and secondary market for emission allowances. 
 
4. Carbon leakage, allocation and border tax adjustments 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, issues of efficiency in the primary and secondary market for 
allowances have been discussed. However, a fundamental question about the efficiency 
of the EU ETS remains since, given low barriers for movements of capital and 
production capacities around the world, business may delocalize to countries where 
environmental policies are less constraining. This phenomenon is known as carbon 
leakage. 
On the one hand, delocalization of EU firms in order to avoid the costs of purchasing 
allowances, runs against the efficacy of the European trading scheme. Further, if 
emissions move from one country to another and are not reduced overall, the wider 
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objective of keeping global temperatures under control will not be attained. It is 
understood that climate change is a global problem, characterized by externalities so 
that there is little connection between where emissions are generated and where 
disruptions occur. 
On the other hand, if a level playing field for products produced at home and abroad is 
not ensured, the quality of the carbon price signal will be distorted to a certain extent. 
Ideally, many countries would have instruments similar to the ETS linked together so 
that a world price for carbon would emerge. However, for as long as this remains 
unachieved, adjustments to account for the emissions of imported products might be 
necessary to reinforce the quality of the carbon price inside existing trading schemes, 
like the ETS.  
In addition, border adjustments could also address concerns about the loss of 
competitiveness that costs derived from the ETS impose on certain sectors and 
businesses in Europe, by imposing similar costs on similar activities carried elsewhere. 
In this concluding chapter, the way the EU plans to address carbon leakage will be 
examined, together with the effects of possible border adjustments for the overall 
consistency and efficiency of the scheme. The aim is to cover this important aspect of 
emissions-trading so that the reader gains a more comprehensive understanding of the 
issues at stake when considering the efficiency of the ETS.  
 
4.2. Carbon leakage policy in the European Union 
There is carbon leakage, according to Directive 2003/87/EC, where a sector or subsector 
cannot increase prices to pass on the costs derived from the ETS without a “significant 
loss of market share to less carbon efficient installations outside the Community”. Both 
direct costs, resulting from the purchase of allowances, and indirect costs, resulting 
from higher electricity prices, are taken into account in order to assess this exposure.
53
 
Currently, three actions have been devised to confront carbon leakage in the European 
Union: 
 First and foremost, sectors or subsectors significantly exposed to carbon leakage 
qualify for support in the form of free allocation of allowances that would otherwise 
be auctioned.
54
 
 Second, the sectors affected might receive financial support from the Member States 
to compensate the increase in the cost of electricity brought by the ETS. This 
support should respect state aid rules and be based on ex-ante benchmarks of 
indirect emissions of carbon-dioxide per unit of production.
55
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 Article 10a.6, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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 Third, the Union will consider, based on an analytical report to be presented to the 
European Parliament and the Council by 30 June 2010, the suitability of including 
importers within the emissions trading scheme.
56
 
According to Directive 2003/87/EC a sector or subsector is exposed to carbon leakage 
when, either the increases in production costs and intensity of trade
57
 are alternatively 
above 30%, or those increases are above 5% and 10% cumulatively.
58
 In December 
2009, the Commission published the list of these sectors
59
; it contains around 151 
subsectors at NACE4
60
 level of disaggregation and below. Most of them qualify 
because of their exposure to international trade (up to 117 subsectors). Only the 
manufacturing of cement and lime qualify because production costs for those products 
will increase by more than 30% due to the ETS.  
It is worth noting that the assessment carried by the Commission considered 258 
subsectors and assumed a price of allowances of EUR 30
61
 and average 75% 
auctioning
62
. As for the increase in costs of electricity, the assessment assumed average 
emission factors of power plants. Hence, it could be argued that the analysis lacks 
dynamic components. This issue is of particular concern given that inclusion in the list 
is valid for 5 years and, although the list will be reviewed yearly, it will only be 
reviewed for the purpose of examining if other sectors qualify for inclusion.
63
 Another 
concern is that sectors which do not qualify under the quantitative criteria can be 
included in the list on the basis of qualitative analysis, which gives way for private 
interests to exert influence and expand the scope of the list.
64
  
Installations included in the list automatically qualify for the free allocation of 100% of 
the allowances allotted to them. It follows that this restriction of auctioning will distort 
the carbon price signal in the third trading period to an extent dependent on the amount 
of allowances deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage. In total, around 25% of emissions 
covered by the ETS qualify for free allocation of allowances due to carbon leakage, that 
is, more than 75% of the emissions from the manufacturing industry covered by the 
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ETS.
65
 A clearer picture of the relationships between these percentages can be seen in 
the following two graphs.
66
 
 
 
Impact on the primary market for allowances 
From the graphs above, it can be calculated that the total amount of emissions deemed 
at risk of carbon leakage equals more than 10% of total green house gases emitted in the 
European Union. Given that this is approximately 25% of emissions covered by the 
ETS, it is possible to find a good approximation to the amount of allowances that will 
be auctioned in the third trading period. The following table presents these estimates 
and describes the procedure set in Directive 2003/87/EC to allocate allowances. The 
reader should remember that the power sector will receive no free allowances from 
2013.
67
 The calculations assume that the share of each sector in total emissions remains 
unchanged until 2020. 
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 European Commission on frequently asked questions on carbon leakage, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/carbon_en.htm 
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  According to data published by the European Commission, available at 
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 Article 10.a.3, Directive 2003/87/EC. 
Covered by the 
ETS 40% 
Not covered 
by the ETS 
60% 
Emissions of green house gases in the EU 
Power Sector 
63% 
Sectors at risk of 
carbon leakage 
77% 
Sectors not at 
risk of carbon 
leakage 33% 
Industrial sector 
35% 
Emissions of green house gases covered by the ETS 
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Estimated auctioning over the third trading period (million allowances) 
Year 
Estimated 
total cap 
At risk of 
carbon 
leakage 
(100% free 
allocation) 
Residual 
From 
electricity 
generators 
(100% 
auctioning) 
Residual 
Assumed 
auction rate 
for 
residual
68
 
Residual 
auctioned 
Total 
auctioned 
Total 
auctioned 
over 
estimated 
total cap 
- A B C D E F G H I 
- - 25% x A A - B 63% x A A - B - D - E x F D + G H / A 
2013 2.044.722 511.180 1.533.541 1.288.175 245.367 20% 49.073 1.337.248 65% 
2014 2.009.144 502.286 1.506.858 1.265.761 241.097 25% 60.274 1.326.035 66% 
2015 1.974.185 493.546 1.480.638 1.243.736 236.902 30% 71.071 1.314.807 67% 
2016 1.939.834 484.958 1.454.875 1.222.095 232.780 35% 81.473 1.303.568 67% 
2017 1.906.081 476.520 1.429.560 1.200.831 228.730 40% 91.492 1.292.323 68% 
2018 1.872.915 468.229 1.404.686 1.179.936 224.750 50% 112.375 1.292.311 69% 
2019 1.840.326 460.082 1.380.245 1.159.405 220.839 60% 132.503 1.291.909 70% 
2020 1.808.304 452.076 1.356.228 1.139.232 216.997 70% 151.898 1.291.129 71% 
2013-20 17.476.440 4.369.110 13.107.330 11.010.157 2.097.173 36% 750.159 11.760.316 67% 
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 Lower and upper bounds are given by art.10.a.11 Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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It could be thought that given the relatively low share of emissions exposed to carbon 
leakage, even though the award of free allowances is set for them at 100%, the effect on 
the overall percentage of allowances allocated would not be very significant. The 
methodology followed above can also provide good estimates of the impact of the 
provisions about carbon leakage on the primary market for allowances, in terms of 
reductions in the amount of allowances auctioned.  
Estimated impact of carbon leakage on the primary marker for allowances  
(amount of auctioned allowances) 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
No carbon leakage 70% 72% 74% 76% 78% 82% 85% 89% 
25% carbon leakage  65% 66% 67% 67% 68% 69% 70% 71% 
Difference 5% 6% 8% 9% 10% 13% 15% 18% 
 
Hence, on average for the third trading period, the exclusion of 25% of emissions 
covered by the ETS from any auctioning will cause the total number of allowances 
auctioned to decrease from an average 76% to an average 67%, that is, 9% less. This 
represents a reduction in auctioning of about 12%. It can be seen that, although 
moderate, the impact is significant. 
 
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Estimated auctioning over the third trading period 
Total auctioned
Auctioned for power sector
Auctioned for industrial sector not at risk of carbon leakage
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4.3. The proposal to introduce importers in the ETS 
As previously stated, the Union will consider in the second half of 2010, the suitability 
of deepening the scope of the ETS to also comprise undertakings that import products 
of the sort covered by the scheme. Within the logic of emissions-trading, it is thought 
that any extension in scope, like the inclusion of importers, will further the purpose of 
the scheme and improve the quality of the price signal. Nevertheless, it should be borne 
in mind that it is a second best option to the creation of similar schemes in third 
countries. Hence, it follows that imports subject to equivalent measures, like carbon 
taxes, in the country of production, should be exempted from any obligation to purchase 
European allowances. 
An alternative to the inclusion of importers in the ETS is found in border tax 
adjustments. These are taxes payable at the point of entrance of imports in the European 
Union. In a similar fashion as emissions-trading for imports, border tax adjustments 
would reduce the amount of carbon-dioxide emissions that would not be reduced due to 
the delocalization of production capacities. In order to achieve this, both types of 
measures reduce the cost differential of products imported from countries where carbon-
dioxide emissions are not controlled for. 
There is extensive literature that analyses the possibility of implementing border tax 
adjustments. Most of the conclusions drawn by this literature can be extended to the 
inclusion of importers in the ETS. If the Union is rather looking at the later option, it is 
because the ETS has been proved to work reasonably well and provide, in practice, for 
relatively more efficient abatement than carbon taxes. It is not the purpose of this paper 
to detail the reasons that brought the Union to discard carbon taxes and opt for 
emissions-trading. However, it can be argued that implementing border tax adjustments 
in the Union would probably amount to an inefficient duplication of regulatory 
instruments.
69
 Hence, including importers in the ETS appears as the most efficient 
option for the EU to cope with carbon leakage. 
The question that remains unanswered is why installations at risk of carbon leakage 
should be allocated allowances for free if there is a less distortive option available; 
namely the inclusion of importers in the ETS. It might be that there are more difficulties 
than perceived at first sight for the extension of emissions-trading to imported products. 
In fact, as Mattoo (2009, p.16) points out “current World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules and jurisprudence are not settled” and it is unclear whether both border tax 
adjustments or emissions-trading for importers would be compatible with WTO rules. 
While the specific problems that exist should not be treated here, it is worth noting 
some of the key aspects that the Union will have to take into consideration if it finally is 
to bring forward a proposal to include importers in the ETS. Cendra (2009) provides 
some general principles that should guide border adjustments of this kind: 
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 See Böhringer (2006) for a detailed discussion on the relative efficiency of emissions trading and 
carbon taxes when used together.  
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- The measure should avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail (p.144). 
- It should not be protectionist, that is, it should not restrict international trade per se 
but rather be devised to ensure a level-playing field. This entails that importers 
should not face higher costs than local producers. 
- It should not apply for countries where similar measures to the ETS are operational, 
including possibly carbon taxes but maybe not voluntary commitments (p.145). 
The extension of the ETS to importers will nevertheless also face many technical 
difficulties. In particular, assessing the amount of emissions generated by production 
facilities abroad may prove nearly impossible. This is where the determination of 
benchmarks per products based on the performance of the 10% most efficient 
installations from the EU may reveal itself useful. It will allow for easy administration 
of the scheme and ensure importers are not unduly discriminated. Furthermore, the 
option of basing border adjustments on the carbon content of domestic production 
would be less burdensome for third countries, which are in general more carbon-
intensive than the EU. Hence, as Mattoo (2006. p.17) points out, this option is more 
likely to succeed in international negotiations. 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
Following the estimations presented in this chapter, free allocation of allowances for the 
subsectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage will have a moderate but significant impact 
on the total amount of allowances auctioned in the third trading period.
70
 This will 
likely reduce the quality of the price signal and diminish the level of efficiency in the 
primary market for allowances that otherwise would had been achieved.  
Instead, border adjustments could be used to protect domestic sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage while at the same time preserving the efficiency of the primary market for 
allowances. In this regard, extending the scope of the ETS to importers, rather than 
devising a separate instrument, appears as the most efficient option.  
Directive 2003/87/EC presents free allocation and the extension of the ETS to importers 
as complementary instruments. However, there are strong arguments that call for these 
instruments to be considered as alternative options. In particular, if importers are 
included in the trading scheme while domestic producers receive 100% of their 
allowances for free, it would be necessary to extend free allocation to importers. 
Otherwise, there would be undue discrimination between domestic and foreign 
producers, contrary to WTO rules.
71
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If free allocation to domestic producers is discarded, it could also be discarded for 
importers, hence improving the efficiency of the primary market for allowances and 
avoiding the risk of windfall profits. Importers could be allocated a number of 
allowances based on benchmarking against domestic producers and buy them either in 
the primary or the secondary market. This way, both objectives, protecting domestic 
producers from carbon leakage and achieving high efficiency within the ETS, could be 
achieved simultaneously.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The European Union has unilaterally undertaken to reduce its emissions by 20% by 
2020 compared to 1990 levels. Further, the EU is willing to commit to 30% reductions 
if a comprehensive international agreement is achieved.  The key question is whether 
the ETS is fit for the purpose of achieving such deep cuts in emissions. In the search for 
an answer, this paper has looked at certain aspects of the efficiency of the scheme. On 
the one hand, a wide variety of market data have been analysed using economic and 
econometric techniques. On the other hand, building from this evidence, the changes 
brought by the 2009 reform of Directive 2003/87/EC have been discussed. 
In the first chapter, the focus was on trade in the secondary market for allowances. It 
was concluded that although price formation is based on energy fundamentals, no 
upward trend in the evolution of carbon prices can be observed. For this purpose, 
GARCH econometric modelling was applied on energy prices and derived data, which 
accounted for the emission coefficients and efficiency rates of coal and gas when used 
to produce electricity. In addition, unit root testing was used to unveil the lack of 
upward trend in the prices of allowances during the second trading period. 
In the second chapter, the focus was on the primary market for allowances. Based on 
market data, it was concluded that allocation has lead to inefficient outcomes so far, 
particularly in the form of oversupply and windfall profits. For the second trading 
period, the extent of overallocation due to the economic downturn was estimated at 150 
million allowances. For the third trading period, changes in allocation methodology due 
to take place were presented. It was concluded that these changes are likely to 
substantially improve the efficiency of the primary market for allowances. In addition, 
the proposal of the Commission of April 2010 for a regulation to fully harmonise 
auctioning was discussed and welcomed. 
In the third and final chapter, carbon leakage and the regime devised by the EU to 
mitigate this phenomenon were introduced in the discussion. Following this, an 
estimation of the overall percentage of allowances to be auctioned in the third period 
was carried out. It was unveiled that free allocation for subsectors deemed at risk of 
carbon leakage will have a moderate but significant impact in the total amount of 
33 
allowances auctioned.
72
 Then, the concept of border adjustments was introduced and it 
was argued that the inclusion of importers into the ETS should be regarded as an 
alternative to free allocation rather than as a complementary instrument, contrary to the 
current approach of the EU. It was concluded that the inclusion of importers in the ETS 
was a better alternative than free allocation for the purpose of enhancing the overall 
efficiency of the scheme and the efficiency of the primary market for allowances in 
particular. 
On the whole, there are three main conclusions to the analysis carried out in this paper. 
First, the emissions trading scheme of the EU is functioning relatively well; carbon 
markets are well developed and the carbon price is well grounded. Second, there are 
nevertheless significant inefficiencies, particularly with regard to the allocation of 
allowances; a primary market for allowances has not yet emerged given that allocation 
remains still a political process to a large extent. Third and final, changes brought by the 
2009 reform of Directive 2003/87/EC are likely to significantly improve the process of 
allocation and this way equip the EU ETS for the challenge of reducing emissions by 
20% by 2020. Although there are several caveats to this latest proposition, which can be 
found throughout the text, it is the opinion of the author that, on balance, the changes 
brought into the scheme are the right ones to achieve the proposed targets and to secure 
the move towards a low-carbon economy in Europe. 
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